REPLY TO THE REV. MARSH'S VINDICATION

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TO THE

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OF

A LATE WORK,

STYLED

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A HISTORY OF THE POLITICS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE.

BY

WILLIAM BELSHAM.

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REPLY

TO THE

REV. HERBERT MARSH'S

VINDICATION, &c.

IT unfortunately happens that controverſy, or, in other words, fair and impartial diſcuſſion, which is a very good thing, is extremely apt to degenerate into contention, or perſonal altercation, which is a very bad one. Taking it for granted, in the Remarks publiſhed by me not many months ſince, on the Hiſtory of Mr. Herbert Marſh, which appeared in my view, as in that of many others, a very fallacious book, that the author impoſed upon himſelf as well as upon his admirers, I made a point of treating him with great perſonal reſpect; eſpecially as in the proper line of his profeſſion, I had ſeen what, in my apprehenſion, diſcovered much good ſenſe and liberality. But Mr. Marſh probably deems

politics, not theology, his *forte*; and will not thank me for a compliment which is accompanied with any such abatement.

Indeed, considering the excessive arrogance of the tone which he assumed and even the gross obloquy which he presumed to cast upon those who were not convinced by his arguments, weak and contemptible as they are, representing us as actuated by obstinacy, perverseness, and "party malevolence;" which I had, in my Remarks, expressly declared that I would not suppose of him; I thought I had some reason to plume myself upon my meekness and forbearance: nor shall I, notwithstanding the rudeness and asperity of his Reply, now descend to use any language inconsistent with *general respect*; although he must pardon me if I cannot refrain from some indications of the very low estimation in which I hold him as a politician. The Public are certainly no further interested in this controversy, than as it relates to the question of aggression respecting the war; but I shall claim their indulgence in saying a few words, *en passant*, in vindication of my own character, unnecessarily and wantonly traduced.

The grand point at issue between Mr. Marsh and

and myſelf is, " Whether the Adminiſtration of " 1792-3 did or did not, by an erroneous and " culpable policy, precipitate theſe nations into " a war with France?" In order to prove the affirmative, it is not in the leaſt neceſſary to ſhew that the Government of France were chargeable with no errors, or that Great Britain had no injuries to complain of; but that ſuch explanations and reparations were offered, as would unqueſtionably have ſerved, had the affairs of Britain been in the hands of wiſe and able Miniſters, as a baſis of reconciliation. When this conceſſion is once made, nine tenths of Mr. Marſh's book becomes altogether irrelevant and uſeleſs; and the remainder is capable of a very eaſy and ſatisfactory anſwer. Mr. Marſh muſt excuſe me, therefore, from entering into the long and tedious details of his two *fatiguing volumes*, which ſerve only to embarraſs and encumber a queſtion, which muſt be determined upon grounds altogether different. And as the volumes of Mr. Marſh contain abundant materials for their own refutation, I muſt beg him not to take it amiſs that I have travelled, and mean to travel, ſo little out of the record.

Mr. Marſh truly obſerves, " that with reſpect to facts we agree;" and it is for the reader to

determine, therefore, whoſe comment upon thoſe facts is moſt juſt, and whoſe concluſions moſt reaſonable. Mr. Marſh is pleaſed to intimate, that I write only for thoſe "of my own party," as he ſtyles it, who have not read his Hiſtory; but I do aſſure him that upon this, as well as upon all other occaſions, I write for all who will do me the honour to read. He ſays, that ſince the firſt publication of his Hiſtory in German, the author of the Remarks is the only perſon who has, either in England or on the Continent, lifted up his voice againſt it. From which he ſeems to infer, that he has all Europe on his ſide; and this merely becauſe no one but myſelf has thought it worth while to revive the diſcuſſion of an obſolete, and now, comparatively ſpeaking, unintereſting queſtion. And had I undertaken to anſwer it in the way in which he ſeems to think it right and proper that I ſhould have done, viz. by entering into a minute examination of all his minute and frivolous reaſonings, I muſt certainly have written two volumes, not leſs dull and fatiguing than his own. In fact, every thing of the leaſt value or importance in Mr. Marſh's pedantic and pompous Hiſtory has been ſaid long ago, and infinitely better ſaid, by Mr. Pitt, in the various able and eloquent ſpeeches made by him in the Houſe of Com-

Commons. But according to Mr. Marſh's vain and partial ideas, it was not till his book came out, that the political opponents of the Miniſtry were to be regarded as abſolutely inexcuſable in their oppoſition.

Mr. Marſh is obliged to confeſs, that I have made very liberal and ingenuous conceſſions; farther indeed, as he juſtly obſerves, than many perſons *of my party* are diſpoſed to accompany me. This, therefore, could only proceed from a real love of truth, and a determined adherence to what appeared ſuch to me. Yet Mr. Marſh charges me, in various paſſages of his Reply, with the meaneſt and moſt diſingenuous artifices, in order to conceal the truth, and the impreſſion which it had made upon my own mind; thus, from his groſs ignorance of human nature, deſcribing qualities which could not poſſibly co-exiſt in the ſame character. Theſe few general remarks may ſuffice as an anſwer to a very large proportion of Mr. Marſh's pamphlet: and avoiding, as far as the nature of the caſe will admit, all perſonality, I ſhall proceed to offer a few animadverſions on what may be deemed the more important parts of this publication, without the ſlighteſt intention of noticing any thing that may hereafter come from the German or

Engliſh pen of Mr. Marſh, on the ſubject of politics.

Mr. Marſh quotes (p. 23), from my Remarks, what he ſtyles a remarkable declaration, which, as he ſays, implies ſomething more than I had previouſly allowed, viz. "that the French Government muſt bear its "ſhare of blame."—"Had France uniformly acted upon a ſyſtem "of moderation and diſcretion, it would indeed "have been extremely eaſy, as M. Dumouriez "juſtly affirms, to have avoided war with Eng-"land."—"Since then," obſerves Mr. Marſh, "as M. Dumouriez affirms, and Mr. Belſham "admits it would have been extremely eaſy for "the French Rulers to have avoided a war "with England, had they uniformly acted upon "a ſyſtem of moderation and diſcretion, it ne-"ceſſarily follows that the want of moderation "and diſcretion on the part of the French Ru-"lers was the impediment to the continuance "of peace; and, conſequently, that it was their "indiſcretion and immoderation which gave "birth to the preſent war." But in what univerſity, foreign or domeſtic, did Mr. Marſh learn this logic? Though I really and ſeriouſly regard Mr. Pitt and his colleagues as very bad politicians, I never accuſed them of being ſuch bad men,

men, as to engage in a war with France without ſome provocation. That for which I, in common with thouſands and tens of thouſands, deem them highly culpable, is for unneceſſarily awakening the jealouſy and reſentment of France, by the recal of Lord Gower, taken in conjunction with the refuſal to recogniſe M. Chauvelin in the capacity of embaſſador; and more eſpecially for the fooliſh and obſtinate indiſpoſition which they ſhewed, to accept of ſuch reparation as the French plainly appeared willing and deſirous to offer, in order to avoid a rupture with England. By their harſh, proud, and petulant rejection of the overtures from France, I thought, and ſhall ever think, that they ſtand charged before God and their Country, for precipitating the nation into a deſtructive and ruinous conteſt, whatever offence the expreſſion may give to Mr. Marſh.

The treaty of Pavia, reſpecting which I conceived that all perſons were now agreed, has been very unexpectedly the cauſe of exciting Mr. Marſh's anger. All that I have ſaid on the ſubject, is as follows: " Mr. Marſh ſpeaks of " the genuineneſs of the Treaty of Pavia as " *doubtful*. It may, however, ſafely be pro- " nounced ſpurious; and therefore it is wholly

" ſuperfluous to vindicate England from the " charge of having either actively or paſſively " acceded to it." A man muſt ſurely be of a diſpoſition peculiarly irritable, who can be offended at this. The very words of Mr. Marſh himſelf are, p. 70: " It is even *doubtful* whe- " ther the treaty itſelf, which is ſaid to have " been concluded in July, 1791, be genuine or " not:" and he then enters into an elaborate vindication of England, upon the hypotheſis of its being genuine. I therefore thought myſelf well warranted, gently to hint the ſuperfluouſneſs of this part of his argument. In reply, Mr. Marſh ſays, " I choſe to combat my adverſaries " on their own hypotheſis, in order to preclude " every ſpecies of objection. Mr. Belſham's af- " fectation, therefore, in taking part with the " foreign powers who were ſaid to have ſigned " the treaty, and correcting my *ſuppoſed* doubts " on the ſubject, is truly ridiculous." It is ridiculous, therefore, it ſeems, to credit Mr. Marſh's profeſſion of his own doubts. This is perhaps too trivial to mention, except as an indication of the extreme and cauſeleſs acrimony which Mr. Marſh diſplays throughout his whole pamphlet; but it is neceſſary that one of us, at leaſt, ſhould keep his temper; and it is not upon any vulgar

vulgar provocation fortunately that I am apt to loſe mine.

Mr. Marſh ſtill perſeveres, p. 30, 31, in maintaining that the report of the Committee for Naval Affairs in the National Aſſembly, March, 1792, refers to an actual, not a proviſional, augmentation of their marine: as I believe him to ſtand altogether ſingle in this aſſertion, and that no perſon in the three kingdoms, except himſelf, ever imagined that the French Government at that period entertained the idea of raiſing 80,000 ſailors, in order to go to war with Great Britain; eſpecially as no addition whatever was at that time made to the naval force actually on foot; and the ſailors, recently in a ſtate of univerſal inſurrection, according to the report of M. de Moleville, were, conformably to that of the Committee, ſtill in a ſtate of diſorganiſation; it is ſuperfluous to attempt the confutation of ſuch extravagant chimæras. Let him ſettle the point with Mr. Pitt, who viewed perfectly unconcerned a tranſaction which filled Mr. Marſh's mind with ſuch terrific apprehenſions; notwithſtanding the recent and confident prediction hazarded by the Miniſter, of fifteen years' uninterrupted peace.

Mr.

Mr. Marſh accuſes me, p. 34, of *very artfully endeavouring* to excite a ſuſpicion againſt the Britiſh Government, on the ſubject of the letter written by the King of France to the King of Great Britain, May 1, 1792. He ſays, "that "as the letter contained no ſpecific propoſition "or propoſal of *terms* of alliance, it was unne- "ceſſary to make a particular reply; that the "only anſwer which was neceſſary, and the only "anſwer which was returned, was that which "the Britiſh Cabinet gave by its conduct, in "continuing the friendſhip ſolicited by his Moſt "Chriſtian Majeſty. Yet Mr. Bellham talks as if "a ſpecific anſwer had been given, though no "one ever heard of it, and ventures to ſay— "'the ſpecific anſwer to this truly noble and "generous overture is not known; it appears "only from the event that it was rejected.'"

Now in anſwer to this idle and injurious charge of *artfully endeavouring*, &c. it is ſufficient to obſerve that I have done very little more than ſtate the important and indubitable fact, that a letter was written to the King of England by the King of France, influenced by the counſels of M. Roland and his colleagues, at this period, containing a very obvious and generous advance to an intimate friendſhip and alliance.

alliance. As no ſuch alliance, or any diſcuſſion relative to it, took place, I inferred that the overture was rejected, though probably in terms of civility. Mr. Marſh ſays that no anſwer was given, which makes the matter ſtill worſe; pretending indeed that no anſwer was neceſſary, no ſpecific terms having been propoſed; as if it were uſual or proper to propoſe in ſimilar caſes ſpecific terms, before the general idea had received the leaſt encouragement. And he offers nothing to diſprove the concluſion of common ſenſe, which he ſtigmatiſes as worſe than empty declamation, "that incalculable miſchiefs might "have been avoided, had this overture met with "a more favourable acceptance."

Great diſpleaſure is conceived by Mr. Marſh, p. 37, at the declaration of my opinion, that the Britiſh Government ought to have come forward at the end of June, 1792, as mediator between France and Auſtria; although I have not confuted the arguments by which, to his own ſatisfaction at leaſt, he has proved that the Britiſh Government would have acted very injudiciouſly in ſo doing. As I believe there is at the diſtance of time to which we have now arrived, ſcarcely any difference of ſentiment relative to the propriety of an amicable and mediatorial interference

rence on the part of England at this criſis,. I was certainly very willing to ſpare myſelf the trouble of replying in detail to Mr. Marſh's long and tireſome arguments; which are, in my opinion, entirely beſide the purpoſe. I have already remarked, and now repeat, that in every controverſy, much muſt be left to the judgment of the reader; and a more eaſy taſk cannot well be aſſigned to him, than that of pronouncing upon the merit of thoſe reaſonings, which Mr. Marſh appears to value ſo highly. Contenting myſelf with deducing very obvious, though very different concluſions, from the ſame general facts, Mr. Marſh is welcome to boaſt that I have not been able to produce a ſingle objection to whole chapters of argumentation. The bare unornamented ſtatement of facts is all that ſeems to me neceſſary to ſweep away the cobweb fabric of this fine-ſpun hiſtory, without ſtopping to ſunder each ſingle attenuated thread. Had the good offices of England been faithfully employed in effecting an accommodation of differences between France and Auſtria, there was the faireſt proſpect of ſucceſs in the attempt. England was at all times well known to be more favourably diſpoſed to the Houſe of Auſtria than to France. The application of France to England, therefore, ſhewed, in contradiction to a thouſand

petty

petty and puny *reaſonings*, the confidence which ſhe placed in the juſtice of her cauſe, and her readineſs to acquieſce in any fair and equitable terms of reconciliation. Had the pride and obſtinacy of Auſtria rendered the mediation of England ineffectual, ſhe might properly have left the Imperial Court to the conſequences of its folly; and would by this means have acquired an irreſiſtible claim upon France, for conceding the neutrality of the Low Countries; the preſervation of which from the Gallic Power was the only good political reaſon for involving this Country in the continental war.

In conſequence of the wiſe and conciliatory conduct of Sir Robert Walpole in the war of 1735, ſo oppoſite to that of Mr. Pitt in 1792, this point was attained without difficulty; and the Court of Vienna clamoured in vain for the aſſiſtance of Great Britain, to extricate her from the diſtreſſing embarraſſments occaſioned by her own raſhneſs and preſumption. But the adminiſtration of Mr. Pitt has been diſtinguiſhed by the ſpirit of haughtineſs. The power of Great Britain is indeed very great when wiſely directed, and to rational objects; but want of political penetration is as conſpicuous in the character of Mr. Pitt, as exuberance of pride; and the

the reſult has been ſuch as it was reaſonable to apprehend. No Miniſter ever challenged the confidence of the Country in a tone ſo lofty; no Miniſter ever expreſſed himſelf with reſpect to France in terms of ſuch inſolence and contumely; no Miniſter, when engaging in a war with that potent enemy, ever before encouraged and countenanced the puerile and prepoſterous idea of marching to the gates of Paris; yet was this talking, bullying, boaſting Miniſter, the only ſtateſman having the direction of the affairs of England, ſince the power of France under the auſpices of Richelieu and Mazarine firſt became formidable, who failed in his attempts to defend the Low Countries from the deſigns of Gallic ambition. But, thank God! to whatever cauſe it may be owing, he is now Miniſter no longer. His ſucceſſors in office cannot act worſe; nor do they poſſeſs, in an equal degree, the fatal talent of diſguiſing the miſchief and abſurdity of their meaſures, by the ſpecious plauſibility of their language; and indeed the new Miniſter, Mr. Addington, has given many proofs of a conciliatory diſpoſition, very oppoſite to the temper and policy of his predeceſſor.

As I never repreſented a junction with France againſt Auſtria and Pruſſia as the beſt policy which

which could be adopted by England, I need not vindicate myſelf from the charge, p. 38, of aiming to plunge the Britiſh Nation into the crater of the burning mountain. I always conceived, and I believe that all "the Gentlemen of my Party" were of a ſimilar opinion, that France was very able to fight her own battles. What we vainly wiſhed for, was the adoption of a firm, temperate, dignified, and impartial ſyſtem of neutrality; a ſyſtem calculated to gain the eſteem, regard, and confidence of Europe, which looked up to Britain as the only power capable of interpoſing her mediatorial offices with advantage or effect, between the two great contending parties.

Mr. Marſh again complains, p. 39, that I have not anſwered his *arguments* in vindication of the recal of Lord Gower, conſequent to the depoſition of the King of France. But it appeared to me that the moſt concluſive and ſatisfactory mode of anſwering the arguments of Mr. Marſh, or any other Miniſterial Advocate, on this point, was to ſtate the ill conſequences which were likely to reſult, and which did in fact reſult, from this groſsly impolitic ſtep, as dictated by the ſuggeſtions of common ſenſe. In vindication of the meaſure of depoſition, which I then regarded,

regarded, and ſtill regard, as a meaſure of political neceſſity, I have unreſervedly avowed my opinion, that Louis XVI. was a traitor to the conſtitution which he had ſworn to defend. This, I think, I have fully proved in the Diſſertation on the Character of Louis XVI. recently publiſhed, by an appeal to documents, *not* taken from the hiſtory of Mr. Marſh; and which, as he thinks himſelf entitled "to beſtow "all his tediouſneſs upon me," I beg leave, in return, to recommend to his peruſal. It does not indeed contain any long trains of ſubtle and ſcholaſtic reaſonings, but plain and important facts, leading to immediate and inevitable concluſions. In anſwer to Mr. Marſh's obſervation, that there are only three caſes ſpecified in the Conſtitutional Act, by which the crown could be declared vacant, it is neceſſary to remind him, that the ſafety of the ſtate is the ſupreme law; and that the natural right of the people to provide for their own ſafety, could not be annihilated by any poſitive act. The Conſtitution of England, I think, more wiſely ſpecifies no caſe whatever which will legaliſe popular reſiſtance to regal deſpotiſm. The Revolution of 1688, therefore, was as irregular a tranſaction, and as little to be juſtified by the letter of any law, as the depoſition of the King of France in 1792.

They

They both reſt upon the foundation of the *ſuprema lex;* which is not to be ſacrificed to ſubordinate conſiderations.

I have aſked with ſome degree of triumph, as Mr. Marſh ſtates, p. 41, Why ſhould we incur any political riſks in oppoſing the downfal of a government which had ſhewn itſelf, even according to Mr. Marſh's own repreſentation, uniformly treacherous and hoſtile? He ſays that we did not oppoſe it, but remained perfectly neutral. But if we did not join in any active meaſures to prevent the downfal of it, we perſiſted moſt obſtinately and haughtily in our refuſal to recogniſe the government which immediately ſucceeded to the monarchy; by which means we involved ourſelves moſt unneceſſarily and unwiſely in the greateſt political embarraſſments; ſo that the queſtion, as to the ſpirit of it, is merely evaded, and not anſwered. Had it not been for our impolitic and prepoſterous predilection for the Gallic Monarchy, we could not have delayed for a day our recognition of the Gallic Republic; much leſs have madly engaged in the cruſade againſt it.

Notwithſtanding the cavilling objection of Mr. Marſh, p. 43. I here repeat, "that the recal of

" Lord Gower was a mighty ſhock to the feel-
" ings of that high-ſpirited and gallant people,
" who carry to a pitch which borders upon the
" romantic their ideas of the point of honour"
—meaning, as every one but a profeſſed contro-
verſialiſt will perceive by the word " honour" in
this connection, not moral or political rectitude,
but merely the love of fame and dread of diſ-
grace; and in this ſenſe who will be bold enough
to affirm, that it is not characteriſtic of the
French Nation? But for dull or captious readers,
it is impoſſible to write with ſufficient clearneſs;
and indeed not worth while to write at all. I
ſtill retain my opinion, in oppoſition, I know, to
great authorities, and with ſome heſitation, that
the Britiſh Cabinet, or at leaſt that the Britiſh
Miniſter, did not intend eventually to involve
Great Britain in hoſtilities with France, by the
recal of Lord Gower, which produced a much
greater ſenſation in that country than was pro-
bably expected or deſigned; but I believe Mr.
Pitt to have been as little acquainted with
French, as he afterwards ſhewed himſelf to be
with Iriſh, or ſtill more recently with Dutch,
human nature *.

The

* The prediction of Mr. Pitt, founded upon *his knowledge of human nature*, that the inhabitants of Holland would be eager

The wiſdom and policy of M. Le Brun in accepting the apology, poor as it was, of the Court of London, for the recal of Lord Gower, are manifeſt; but when Mr. Marſh exclaims that I, in defiance of Le Brun, have ventured to accuſe the Britiſh Cabinet of a hollow neutrality of words, contradicted by her own public act, he can hardly expect a ſerious anſwer. If M. Le Brun did not think the recal of Lord Gower a virtual departure from the ſyſtem of neutrality

eager to join the Engliſh on their landing, A.D. 1799, and to caſt off the Gallic yoke, was as unfortunate as all the other predictions which he has hazarded during the preſent war.

With reſpect to the impreſſion made by the revocation of Lord Gower, we are informed by Mr. O'Bryen, who was at Paris ſhortly after this event had taken place, that M. Briſſot declared in his preſence, "that he never deſpaired of the "duration of the peace with England, until the recal of the "Engliſh Ambaſſador; that the French were well aware of "the hoſtile diſpoſition of the Engliſh Miniſtry, from the "beginning of the Revolution; they had hopes, however, "that the unprovoked injuſtice of ſuch a meaſure would pre-"vent the acceſſion of England to the coalition: but the recal "of the Ambaſſador, and ſending no one to replace him, was "too clear an explanation of the Hanoverian Miniſter's con-"duct at the Diet of Ratiſbon; who appeared more as a "factor for the Duke of Brunſwick's army, than the envoy of "a power which had repeatedly promiſed its neutrality." *Utrum Horum*, p. 43.

profeſſed by England—if after that event he conceived it to be any thing more than a hollow neutrality of words, void of real amity, and not for a moment to be depended on, ſhould a favourable opportunity offer to break with the Republic—then was the Miniſter for Foreign Affairs the moſt credulous of all political dupes. But it by no means follows, that becauſe England manifeſted an hoſtile diſpoſition, ſhe meant at all events to engage in a war with France; that fatal reſolution appears to have been excited by cauſes not then foreſeen or expected.

To the plain queſtion, Why, *if* England never meant to depart from her neutrality, and *if* Lord Gower was authoriſed to aſſure the Government of France that his recal was not deſigned as a departure from it, was he ordered to depart at all? no clear or ſatisfactory anſwer can poſſibly be given; although ſuch readers as have time and patience may find reaſons in plenty, ſuch as they are, aſſigned for this act of folly in the ninth chapter of Mr. Marſh's Hiſtory. Notwithſtanding that the Daniſh Miniſter, as Mr. Marſh tells us, received letters of recal at the ſame time with thoſe of the greater powers, whom it highly imported Denmark not to offend, it ſo *happened* that Baron Blohm did not leave

leave Paris immediately; owing, as Mr. Marſh ſays, to *illneſs*, which ſome ſuſpicious perſons might, in ſuch ſuſpicious circumſtances, be apt enough to ſuppoſe altogether political. But in all theſe caſes, how neceſſary is it again and again to repeat that the hoſtile mind is every thing; and that the different ſpirit and temper with which the ſame actions are performed, will produce the moſt oppoſite effects! Of this great truth that great ſtateſman Count Bernſtorf was perfectly ſenſible; and the French Government, clearly diſcerning the pacific diſpoſition by which the Court of Denmark was actuated, far from ſhewing any inclination to cavil, much leſs to quarrel, treated her both before and after this event with uniform attention and reſpect.

Mr. Marſh is pleaſed to affirm, p. 46, "that "I have repreſented as *highly meritorious* the "conduct of the new French Government, in "permitting M. Chauvelin to remain in Lon- "don after Lord Gower was recalled from Pa- "ris." Were I inclined to uſe that controverſial ſtyle of which Mr. Marſh is ſo great a maſter, I might call this *a ſhameful miſrepreſentation, which betrays the conſciouſneſs of being engaged in a deſperate cauſe*, &c. But he is welcome to all the advantage which this ſort of

rhetoric can afford him. My words are merely and preciſely as follow: "Thus while the Court "of London plumed itſelf upon its moderation, "in permitting M. Chauvelin to prolong his re- "ſidence in England, the French Government, "loth to break with the Engliſh Nation, yet "indignant at the treatment of the Engliſh "Court, claimed, with at leaſt equal reaſon, "equal merit, from her ſilence and ſufferance "under this unmerited affront." But Mr. Marſh informs us, that letters were actually ſent over to M. Chauvelin, and that the Embaſſador procured a revocation of them by repreſenting, "that though he was not well with the Engliſh "Miniſter, yet he was perfectly ſo with Mr. "Fox, and ſome other members of Oppoſition; "and that it would not be prudent in France "to loſe the fruit of his labours with theſe gen- "tlemen, and their ſubſequent ſervices, for a "vain form of diplomatic etiquette." With a view, no doubt, to throw ſome reflection upon Mr. Fox and the members of Oppoſition, this paſſage is inſerted twice in Mr. Marſh's ineſtimable hiſtory. But will Mr. Marſh dare to ſay openly and unequivocally, that there was the ſlighteſt irregularity in maintaining an intercourſe of familiarity and friendſhip with M. Chauvelin at this juncture? It was naturally the firſt intention

tion of the French Government to recal M. Chauvelin, in conſequence of the recal of Lord Gower. But when they were reminded that many perſons, eminent for political wiſdom and ability, and high in the public eſteem, were totally adverſe to the meaſures of Adminiſtration, and ardently deſirous to employ their influence in preſerving thoſe relations of peace and amity which, when once broken, are ſo difficult to reſtore, the French Executive Council judged, very properly, that the effect of the good offices of theſe perſons was not to be hazarded, by adhering to a vain form of diplomatic etiquette. And had the Nation fortunately been guided at this critical moment by the counſels of Mr. Fox, there cannot exiſt a rational doubt but that this grand purpoſe would have been attained. A continental peace, under the mediation of England, would in all probability have ſpeedily followed; the life of the unfortunate Louis might have been ſaved, and the repoſe of the world been ſecured. But this ſcholaſtic politician is as incapable of comprehending the force of Mr. Fox's genius, or of eſtimating the effects of his policy, as a beetle on the ſummit of Teneriffe of including in his minute ſurvey the magnificent extent of the horizon*.

Were

* I have frequently declared, and though it may bear ſome

Were I inclined, again may I ſay, to adopt the polite language of Mr. Marſh, I might, with ſome colour of juſtice—much more indeed than has generally ſerved his purpoſe — complain, that, *in order the better to miſrepreſent my meaning, his quotation*, p. 48, *from my Remarks, is very artfully mutilated and garbled.* But, not to ſtand upon trifles, or magnify mole-hills into mountains, I beg leave to ſtate, that after having again, in conſequence of Mr. Marſh's preſſing intreaties, and to my own great loſs of time, read over chap. x. of his Hiſtory, I ſtill retain both my opinions, 1ſt, That it does not *clearly* appear how far the popular orators in the Convention credited their own extravagances; having, as I obſerved in that part of the ſentence which Mr. Marſh omitted to quote, an obvious intereſt, at all events, in making others believe

appearance of exaggeration, it is, ſo far as I am able to judge, ſtrictly and literally true, that had I heard all the ſpeeches, and read all the papers and pamphlets, which have been publiſhed by or for the Administration, relative to the preſent ruinous conteſt with France, on the one ſide, and merely the few immortal pages addreſſed to his conſtituents by Mr. Fox, on the other, I ſhould enter in a perfectly clear and decided opinion of the folly and injuſtice of the war on the part of Britain; though I ſhould undoubtedly regard the conduct of France as in many reſpects highly cenſurable.

them

them. If they conceived that they had it in their power to excite an inſurrection, which M. Le Brun and other perſons high in office, alluded to by Mr. Miles, probably might, it does not follow that they ſeriouſly expected this inſurrection to terminate in the ſubverſion of Kingly Government in England. On the contrary, it was manifeſt, beyond all poſſibility of queſtion, that the adherents of the eſtabliſhed form of government were incomparably more numerous and powerful than the Jacobins and Republicans. An inſurrection, therefore, could ultimately operate, as the French Government doubtleſs ſaw, only to their own ruin. And, 2dly, I am of opinion that the French Government did not entertain agents in England, with a view to excite public diſturbances, for this plain reaſon, becauſe none ſuch have ever been detected; though undoubtedly, like *lawful and regular* Governments, they had their ſpies and reporters, who might ſometimes miſlead them, as lawful and regular Governments have been ſometimes miſled.

As to Mr. Marſh's account of the plot in December, 1792, as he *candidly* allows it to be *unauthentic*, or in plain Engliſh fictitious, it would be very ſuperfluous in me to waſte any more words

words upon it. He is extremely diſpleaſed that I have not noticed his declaration, in reſpect to its not being an authentic document; and is obliging enough to adviſe me, p. 54, to let my readers know what is authentic, and what is not authentic, in my own works. But unfortunately this example of Mr. Marſh, however laudable, cannot be the object of my imitation; as I have never yet inſerted any thing in my own works, of which I did not, at the time at leaſt, believe the authenticity, though I ſhall always be happy to correct any miſtake from ſubſequent and better information.

With the general views I have invariably entertained of the nature of the quarrel between England and France, I cannot but moſt firmly believe, that had Lord Gower remained at Paris, the offenſive extravagances of the Convention, in relation to the ſeditious addreſſes, would never have taken place: and the counter-aſſertion of Mr. Marſh, p. 54, "that whoever has ſtudied "the principles and ſprings of action of that "turbulent aſſembly, will never credit this," only proves to me, that he knows little of the ſprings or principles by which human nature itſelf is actuated. Indeed, by writers of the deſcription of Mr. Marſh, the French are ſcarcely allowed

allowed to be human beings, participating in the ſame common nature; which is leſs a libel upon them than upon the almighty Author of nature, whoſe ſublime characteriſtic it is to hate nothing which he has made.

What good reaſon can be aſſigned, why France ſhould not have been as well diſpoſed to maintain the relations of peace and amity with Great Britain, as with Denmark, Sweden, and America, had ſhe conceived that Britain was amicably diſpoſed towards her? In fact, as long as there was the leaſt chance of retaining the friendſhip, or even the neutrality, of England, France ſhewed herſelf eager to cheriſh a cloſe political connection with the Britiſh Crown; and it was not till ſhe conceived her advances to be ſlighted, and her government inſulted, that ſhe gave a looſe to her impolitic and paſſionate reſentment.

Mr. Marſh miſtakes greatly in ſuppoſing, p. 55, I meant to affirm that the Alien and other bills were paſſed in contravention to the Commercial Treaty. I merely intended to refer to the laſt-mentioned of thoſe bills, viz. that for prohibiting the exportation of foreign corn to France through the medium of England, when the exportation

portation was free and open to all other countries; which M. Chauvelin remonſtrated againſt in terms of great energy; and which even Mr. Marſh will ſcarcely deny to be a violation of the ſubſiſting treaty. This, therefore, was an unlucky opportunity of recommending to me a reperuſal of his Hiſtory for my better information: though I do acknowledge that there is an ambiguity in the conſtruction of the ſentence relative to theſe bills, which might lead into error men of greater candour and ſagacity than the hiſtorian Mr. Marſh.

The next obſervation of Mr. Marſh, and which aſſumes the air of great importance, though reducible to a mere verbal criticiſm, p. 57, is this: that I have repreſented the decree of December 15, as the conſequence of meaſures taken by Parliament, after the decree itſelf had paſſed; ſuch as the Alien Bill, the Corn Bill, and other hoſtile acts: and Mr. Marſh exults much in the detection of this *blunder*, as he politely ſtyles it, and as it indeed well deſerved to be ſtyled, if it were poſſible ſeriouſly to ſuppoſe it could be made. For the ſake of Mr. Marſh, and the very few other perſons for whom I ſhould imagine a comment to be neceſſary, I will deſcend to a little explanation of the paragraph in queſtion.

tion. The Parliament, I have expreſsly ſaid, actually met, December 13, in a moſt unuſual time and manner; and every artifice was put in practice by the Miniſters, and but too ſucceſsfully, to excite a national alarm. Amongſt other particulars, mention is made of the calling out the Militia, the fortifying of the Tower, and the formal denunciation of the French, in the ſpeech from the Throne; which could ſcarcely fail, as to the ſubſtance of it, to be known at Paris on the fifteenth, having been publiſhed in all the London papers on the twelfth. I then proceed to ſtate the various offenſive bills which were paſſed by Parliament ſubſequent to their meeting. Theſe meaſures, it is remarked, ſpeaking of them collectively, were not of a nature to paſs unnoticed by the Convention of France. I then enumerate the ſteps taken by the Convention in conſequence of theſe meaſures. The earlieſt effect of the firſt of this ſeries of provocations, and in the expectation doubtleſs of further and greater, was ſeen in the decree of the 15th of December, which Mr. Marſh chooſes to aſſert that I repreſented as the effect of the meaſures which were ſubſequent to the decree. I feel almoſt aſhamed to reply to theſe contemptible cavils, and really hope that Mr. Marſh, on reflection,

reflection, will feel almoſt aſhamed of having made them.

I am far from denying that an oblique threat to England might be intended by the Decree of December 15th; and have no doubt of the readineſs of the Convention to claſs her with the deſpots of Europe if ſhe choſe to act the ſame part with them. When M. Baraillon, a well-known royaliſt, propoſed, a few days afterwards, a reſolution purporting to reſtrict the meaning of the decree of November to the countries actually at war with France, he manifeſtly aimed to reduce the Convention to this dilemma:—If they rejected the reſolution, a clamour would be immediately raiſed, that England and Holland were included in the ſcope of this decree; if they adopted it, they would appear to act with groſs inconſiſtency in excluding from the operation of the decree, Spain, Portugal, and other deſpotic governments with whom they might eventually be engaged in hoſtility. This artifice was ſo eaſily ſeen through, that the Convention paſſed immediately, without debate, to the order of the day. Yet this common evaſion of an inſidious propoſition, Mr. Marſh regards as a virtual declaration of their intention to apply

apply the decree of November 19th to Great Britain.

The argument on which Mr. Marſh builds ſo much in his boaſted XIIth chapter, proves in my opinion nothing at all to his purpoſe; and reſolves itſelf into a mere *petitio principii*. From certain expreſſions in the decree of 15th December, he infers that France, by the promulgation of that decree, *declared war againſt the people and king of Great Britain*, and demonſtrated its intention of over-turning the Britiſh government and conſtitution. But if the Britiſh Government had put the ſame conſtruction upon this decree with Mr. Marſh, would they, for ſix weeks after this declaration of war, have continued to negotiate with France in any mode, regular or irregular, official or extra-official? Would not M. Chauvelin have been immediately ordered to depart the kingdom? On this and on many other occaſions, Mr. Marſh's ideas differ ſo widely from thoſe of the miniſters, then at the head of the Britiſh counſels, that his inferences bear at leaſt as hard upon his friends as his enemies; and ſcarcely merit from either a ſerious anſwer.

The preamble to this famous decree contains the following words: "The National Conven-
"tion—

" tion—faithful to the principles of the fove-
" reignty of the people, which does not permit
" them to acknowledge any inſtitution that mili-
" tates againſt it—decrees," &c. " Thus the
" National Convention," ſays Mr. Marſh, " vir-
" tually declared that it acknowledged no king-
" ly, and conſequently not the Britiſh govern-
" ment; for kingly government of every de-
" ſcription," he ſays, " had been repeatedly re-
" probated as an inſtitution inconſiſtent with
" the ſovereignty of the people." But by whom? by ſome anarchiſts perhaps in the convention; not by the miniſter of foreign relations and the organ of the Executive Council to foreign powers M. Le Brun, who, in his excellent anſwer to Lord Gower's notification of recal, ſtyles the Engliſh nation, " Un peuple éclairé et fier, qui
" le premier a reconnu et établi le principe de la
" Souveraineté Nationale."

But farther, the very firſt article of the decree begins thus: " In thoſe countries which are, or
" ſhall be, occupied by the armies of the French
" Republic, the generals ſhall immediately pro-
" claim, in the name of the French Nation, the
" ſovereignty of the people, and the abolition of
" all conſtituted authorities," &c. To this I have already given, in the Remarks, what I conceive

to

to be a very ſufficient anſwer. As the war againſt France was waged for the expreſs purpoſe of reſtoring the antient deſpotiſm, and of ſubverting the infant freedom of the republic, the French government deemed themſelves fully juſtified in avowing their intention of deſtroying the oppreſſive tyrannies of thoſe who had joined in the flagitious confederacy againſt them. And if Great Britain choſe to rank herſelf, after the torrents of blood ſhe had ſhed in defence of her own liberties, with thoſe deſpots who had combined to ſubvert the liberty of France, ſhe might certainly infer from this decree that France would make no exceptions in her favour. As long as England preſerved any appearance of amity to France, ſhe was invariably ſpoken of, not merely in terms of reſpect, but frequently of flattery and admiration: and if England had not been conſcious of the hoſtile mind ſhe bore to France, ſhe would never have ſuppoſed herſelf included in the ſcope of the decree of November.

Mr. Marſh, in oppoſition to the opinion which I have given, maintains, p. 61, that the conduct of the Executive Council was not more temperate than that of the Convention; and he mentions the circular letter of Monge in proof of

this; as if that letter was a meaſure of the Executive Council. Monge and Pache were avowed Jacobins, who diſdained, in common with the reſt of their party, to adopt any temperament, ſo ſoon as they conceived that England had ſhewn herſelf decidedly hoſtile. On the contrary, Le Brun, Garat, Clavieres, and Roland, were men of ſenſe and moderation, who ſincerely and earneſtly wiſhed to effect a reconciliation between the two countries. As to the purpoſed appeal of the French government to the Engliſh nation, Mr. Marſh ſhould recollect that it was *only* purpoſed; and laid aſide upon more mature reflection; although a precedent was not wanting for this improper interference, in the famous memorial of Count Palm, the accredited miniſter of a regular and approved government, cloſely connected with Great Britain by the ties of intereſt, friendſhip, and alliance.

But the grand proof which Mr. Marſh urges in order to evince the determination of the French Government to enter at all events into a war with England, is the order iſſued by the Executive Council, January 10th, to General Miranda, to put his troops in motion in order to invade the Dutch territory, three days only after having tranſmitted the pacificatory diſpatch ſigned

ed by Le Brun to England. But this argument, ſpecious and impoſing as it may ſeem at firſt ſight, will not bear the ſlighteſt teſt of inveſtigation. On ſeveral occaſions ſubſequent to the recal of Lord Gower, the French Government had given what to every impartial mind muſt appear indiſputable proofs of its deſire to avoid, if poſſible, a rupture with England. On the departure of the Engliſh embaſſador, M. Le Brun had expreſſed himſelf in terms the moſt reſpectful and even flattering with regard to England. In the ardent deſire of preſerving a medium of amicable intercourſe, M. Chauvelin was ordered to remain in England although he was not recognized as embaſſador of the republic. And ſo late as the month of December, 1792, M. Dumouriez, as he himſelf aſſures us, Memoirs, vol. III. p. 407, informed the miniſter Le Brun, in his diſpatches from the Netherlands, "that it was impoſſible to advance, or even to "defend the Meuſe, without being in poſſeſſion "of Maeſtricht. The garriſon was incomplete, "and the place ſo ill provided, that it could not "have held out a ſingle week. Le Brun in "anſwer to the reiterated demands of the gene-"ral, commanded him to obſerve a ſtrict neu-"trality, which was maintained with the utmoſt "preciſion, although the Dutch government did

" not give itſelf the trouble of diſſembling its " predilection to the Imperialiſts and Pruſſians. " A prohibition, under pain of death, had juſt " been eſtabliſhed, forbidding any proviſion to " be delivered to the French army, while im- " menſe magazines were eſtabliſhed, with the " conſent of the Dutch Government, on the " Lower Rhine, for the Emperor and the King " of Pruſſia*." Laſtly, the diſpatch of M. Le Brun to Lord Grenville, dated January 7th, was in the higheſt degree conciliatory, and contained *conceſſions* of the greateſt magnitude.

Theſe facts are abſolutely and altogether irreconcileable with the hypotheſis that France was determined upon a war with England; but the circumſtances accompanying the order to Miranda admit of a very eaſy and obvious ſolution on the oppoſite hypotheſis, that France was ſincerely ſolicitous to effect an amicable accommodation with England. Upon a general review of the events which had taken place in ſuch quick ſucceſſion during the laſt thirty days; the proclamation for calling the parliament, the

* I ſhould have been happy to have borrowed *this authority* from the hiſtory of Mr. Marſh—where I looked for it in vain.

artifices

artifices of alarm, the embodying of the militia, the openly hoſtile ſpeech of the king, the inimical bills, and above all, the haughty and implacable ſpirit of Lord Grenville's anſwer to M. Chauvelin's memorial; it is morally certain that M. Le Brun in penning his excellent diſpatch of the 7th January, muſt have entertained very faint hopes of the final ſucceſs of the negotiation. Every thing would, however, depend upon the reply of Lord Grenville, which could not be long delayed. As it was known, from the ſtrict alliance and reciprocal engagements ſubſiſting between England and Holland, that hoſtilities with the latter muſt be the inevitable conſequence of a war with the former, the Executive Council reſolved to ſecure the advantage of an early attack and ſurpriſe; for the accompliſhment of which purpoſe an order was ſent to General Miranda to invade Holland, not *as ſoon as poſſible*, according to the gloſs of Mr. Marſh, but in twelve days at fartheſt; that time being doubtleſs allowed for making the neceſſary preparations. M. Dumouriez, in communicating the order of Council, ſays, indeed, "there is "no time to loſe," and that "the whole de-"pends upon promptitude and ſecreſy;" and certainly an invaſion within twelve days would diſplay great promptitude, and its concealment

require great ſecreſy. Within this time, upon the general hypotheſis now ſtated, M. Le Brun expected to receive deciſive intelligence from England; which, if favourable, would of courſe be followed by counter-orders to Miranda. Had the order of Council even been expreſſed in the ſtrong and abſolute words uſed by Mr. Marſh, *as ſoon as poſſible,* it would not have invalidated the force of this reaſoning, or the conſiſtency of this hypotheſis; becauſe M. Dumouriez, and of courſe the Executive Council, muſt have known the impoſſibility of putting the plan of invaſion immediately in execution. General Miranda himſelf, in his anſwer to Dumouriez, ſays, "Je "crois votre plan bien difficile à exécuter dans "la ſituation de nudité, et manque abſolu de "magazins, où nos armées ſe trouvent." And ſo convinced was General Dumouriez and the Council of the truth of this repreſentation, that the project was for the preſent entirely laid aſide.

After this perhaps needleſs explanation of what I have advanced upon this ſubject in the Remarks, I may well be ſpared the irkſome taſk of replying circumſtantially to the ſophiſtical and abuſive declamation of Mr. Marſh, who is after all obliged to confeſs that I had literally copied the

the expreſſion uſed in the order ſent to Miranda; ſo that the reader of the Remarks might judge for himſelf whether I had, or had not, given the true meaning of it. I have ſtyled the order, it is true, a proviſional order, which, in this view of the tranſaction, it muſt neceſſarily be; and I have taken the liberty of putting ſuch a conſtruction upon it as it appeared to me that common ſenſe and political conſiſtency required. But as I ventured not to alter or diſguiſe a ſingle ſyllable of the original, the malignant inſinuations of Mr. Marſh muſt, I am ſure, degrade his own character infinitely more than they can injure mine; and my feelings have long been callous to unmerited obloquy.

The remaining part of Mr. Marſh's pamphlet appears to me ſo much below notice, that I can ſcarcely force my pen to proceed. I ſhall be as conciſe as poſſible. Like antient Piſtol with his leek, I eat and execrate. Were I indeed to enter as much into the minute details relative to this controverſy as Mr. Marſh himſelf has done, and as he ſeems eagerly deſirous upon all occaſions that I ſhould alſo do, it would, I fear, be in vain to expect any readers, conſidering how obſolete the queſtion has now become, and how

weary, notwithſtanding its hiſtorical importance, every body ſeems to be of it.

With reſpect to the very important correſpondence between M. Chauvelin and Lord Grenville, I am ſo well ſatisfied with what I have advanced in the Remarks, that I am under little temptation to add to it, and ſtill leſs to ſubtract from it. I muſt, however, appeal to the impartial reader whether Mr. Marſh is well founded in his *candid* inſinuation, p. 76, that I have, for ſome unfair purpoſe, I know not what, ſuppreſſed divers material paſſages of M. Chauvelin's note of December 27th. Upon the very face of it, nothing can be more evident than that I meant to give the ſubſtance of it only, which was my original intention in regard to the whole correſpondence. But it afterwards occurred to me that it would be more acceptable to print the letters at full length; although I was prevented by want of time, and perhaps of patience, from re-tranſcribing what I had already written, which in order to obviate theſe wretched cavils it would certainly have been adviſable to have done. But ſuch is the nature of the accuſations which I am doomed to, what may well be ſtyled the hard taſk of anſwering.

M. Chauvelin's note, I have ſaid, and ſtill ſay, contains great conceſſions, conſidering them as made voluntarily, and at the opening of a negotiation. The decree of November had given offence to England: but M. Chauvelin, in the name of the French Government, expreſsly declares that this decree is not applicable to neutral or friendly powers; and was not intended to favour inſurrection in any country. After ſuch an explanation, would any country in its ſenſes—which England at that moment unhappily was not—think of involving itſelf in a war on account of this decree, with whatever latitude it might ſeem to be worded? Holland was ſuppoſed to be in danger. M. Chauvelin declares that France will not attack Holland while that power contains itſelf within the bounds of neutrality. Nor is there any reaſon to believe that Holland ever would have been attacked, if England had not officiouſly, and unaſked, taken under her protection an ally whom ſhe was utterly unable to defend—proving in the iſſue not a broken reed merely but a ſpear. As to the queſtion of the Scheldt, had M. Chauvelin repreſented the free navigation of that river as a right of primary importance which France was under an indiſpenſable obligation to defend, it might have appeared probable that ſhe ſecretly meditated

meditated hoſtility; as, on the contrary, from the depreciating language of M. Chauvelin, it might not unreaſonably be inferred, that were the negotiation conducted in the ſpirit of amity, France would not ſuffer this claim to be an inſuperable bar to the ſucceſsful termination of it. Weighed in the great political ſcale of Europe, the opening of the Scheldt was indeed a conſideration of trivial moment; though I have allowed that, abſtractedly ſpeaking, it could not properly be ſtyled ſo, which Mr. Marſh conſtrues into an admiſſion on my part that M. Chauvelin is chargeable with a falſehood. This is all I think neceſſary, and I believe many perſons will think it much more than was neceſſary, to ſay, in reply to the deſpicable quirks and quibbles of Mr. Marſh on this ſubject.

As to Mr. Marſh's vindication of Lord Grenville's anſwer, p. 87—95, I deem the advocate worthy of the patron, and the patron of the advocate. One curious circumſtance contained in it ſeems alone to call for ſpecific notice. Amongſt many things new and ſtrange in Lord Grenville's reply to M. Chauvelin's memorial, the moſt extraordinary and extravagant by far, is the demand made by his lordſhip, while France was actually engaged in a dangerous war with a moſt

moſt formidable combination of enemies, " *of* " *confining herſelf within her own territory—if* " *ſhe is really deſirous of maintaining friendſhip* " *and peace with England.*" This Mr. Marſh pretends could not be conſidered as injurious to France, becauſe it was nothing more than the French rulers themſelves, from the commencement of the revolution, had declared to be the baſis of their new ſyſtem of politics. It is true, that the National Aſſembly did, to their great honour, eſtabliſh the renunciation of conqueſt as a baſis of the new ſyſtem: but conſidering the nature of man, and the general courſe of human affairs, it was ſcarcely to be expected that a principle ſo virtuous and diſintereſted would long be acted upon. That aſſembly, however, could never intend, except it meant to ſtultify itſelf, to reſtrain the French nation while war was actually raging, and France had been recently invaded, from avenging the injuries ſhe had received by carrying her arms into the territories of her enemies. And if France, by way of *indemnity for the paſt, and ſecurity for the future*, departed from her original purpoſe, by appropriating ſome of her conqueſts to her own uſe, this could not be a legitimate ſubject of complaint, ſince it had been the immemorial practice of all the eſtabliſhed, regular, and approved governments

vernments in Europe. To require France alone to act upon a principle of perfect disinterestedness, while all other powers were at liberty to pursue their respective plans of ambition and aggrandisement, was rather too hard a condition; and if England would not deign to grant her friendship to France but upon terms which would leave her completely to the mercy of her enemies, it is no wonder that France should decline the insidious favour.

Notwithstanding the intolerable insolence of this demand, which might perhaps have justified the French Government in breaking off all negotiation; and which, with the concomitant circumstances, must necessarily have left little hope of a favourable conclusion to it; M. Le Brun transmitted without delay to England a dispatch, written with his own hand, and which will ever remain an illustrious monument of diplomatic ability and moderation. In this memorial M. le Brun considers very justly the dispute as reduced to two specific causes of complaint;—the decree of November, with its attendant circumstances, and the navigation of the Scheldt. Instead of replying minutely to the minute, sophistical, and captious observations of Mr. Marsh, I shall upon this, as on other occasions, explain a little more

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at large than in the Remarks, what, as it appears to me, the conduct of a great ſtateſman, Mr. Fox for inſtance, and no greater can be named, would have been in the ſituation of Lord Grenville; and comparing it with that actually adopted, every one may judge for himſelf as he pleaſes, of the wiſdom with which the negotiation was conducted.

The oſtenſible cauſes of difference were indeed confined to the decree of November, and the opening of the Scheldt: but the real ground of anxiety and apprehenſion to a Burleigh, a Bernſtorf, or a Fox, muſt undoubtedly have been the aſcendency recently acquired by France, and the injury which might eventually reſult to England, particularly by the incorporation of the Auſtrian Low-Countries with the territory of the Republic. The grand queſtion to be determined was, whether the Government of France was really ſolicitous to maintain peace and amity with England? If ſhe felt in any degree that ſolicitude, ſhe would of courſe diſcover a readineſs to make certain ſacrifices, in order to preſerve it.

With reſpect to the decree of November, M. Le Brun takes pains to ſhew that France did not underſtand

underſtand it in a ſenſe hoſtile to England; and to explain away whatever might appear offenſive in it. If this proved nothing more, it evinced at leaſt that the Government of France was anxious that this obnoxious decree ſhould not be the cauſe of a rupture between the two countries. To purſue the argument farther on the part of the Engliſh Miniſter, was in fact to aſſume the diſquiſitious province of a ſchoolman, and to reſign altogether that of a ſtateſman. With regard to the inſulting proceedings of the Convention, as nothing of this kind happened previous to the period when England was ſuppoſed hoſtile to France, ſo when amity was reſtored, it could not be imagined that any ſimilar outrages would again occur. And as the Executive Council, however they might diſapprove the conduct of the Convention, could not even venture to expreſs that diſapprobation, and much leſs to offer any reparation for it; a juſt regard to the King's dignity required, that as little mention as poſſible ſhould be made of thoſe irregular and licentious acts.

With relation to the Scheldt, though the pretenſions of France could not upon any received principles be ſuſtained, yet they were ſupported by very plauſible arguments; and it was perfectly

fectly clear that the caſe was not of ſuch magnitude as to render it expedient for Great Britain to involve herſelf in a war upon that account only. Upon this head, however, France made a great conceſſion, *viz.* that ſhe would leave the Belgians finally to adjuſt the queſtion with England and Holland.

But the grand political danger to England was, that France, in the height of the elation excited by her recent ſucceſſes, would annex for ever the Belgic Provinces to her territories, as ſhe had already done with reſpect to the duchy of Savoy. That ſhe had not proceeded to this extremity, notwithſtanding the ambitious views of aggrandiſement ſhe had now diſcloſed, and the great temptation which they held out, could not, and cannot poſſibly be aſcribed with the leaſt colour of plauſibility to any other motive than the deſire of her Government not to involve itſelf in a war with England. There was indeed a formidable party in France, which, enraged at the conduct of England, and eager to exalt the power and grandeur of the Republic, would have ventured without heſitation upon this meaſure; but when Danton, the chief of this party, formally made the propoſition in the Convention in the month of January (1793), it was

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over-ruled. And in the memorial of Le Brun, it is voluntarily and expreſsly declared by the Executive Council, that the occupation of the Netherlands will continue no longer than the war. This then was preciſely the conceſſion which England had moſt reaſon to *wiſh*, and if France was earneſt in her deſire of peace, *to expect*. Nothing therefore remained for a truly wiſe and politic ſtateſman in the place of Lord Grenville, but to ſignify in frank and conciliatory language the acceptance on the part of England of the terms propoſed by France as a baſis of negotiation; and to enquire what ſecurity France was prepared to offer for the performance of her engagement; the buſineſs of the Scheldt being obviouſly comprehended in the greater queſtion relative to the reſtoration of Belgium. Inſtead of this mild and moderate mode of procedure, Lord Grenville tells the embaſſador that his explanations are unſatisfactory, that his offers are illuſory, *and that all the motives which gave riſe to the warlike preparations of England ſtill continue:* repeating the ſame extravagant and inſolent demand—that France ſhould immediately evacuate her conqueſts—which he had made in his former note, to which he refers. A more palpable and egregious act of political pride and folly, or one attended with more fatal conſe-

conſequences, does not occur, it may ſafely be affirmed, in the diplomatic annals of Europe. To put this unprecedented, and almoſt incredible indiſcretion, in the moſt ſtriking point of view, let it be ſuppoſed that France had, in the negotiation at Paris, when the reſtoration of Belgium was made the *ſine qua non* of England, officially declared her determination to relinquiſh the Netherlands at the concluſion of the war, would ſuch a conceſſion have been at that period ſtyled *illuſory?* Would it not have been juſtly conſidered as a very great point gained? And would not England then have been ſenſible of the value of the offer, and been ſatisfied with any reaſonable ſecurity for the performance of it?

Theſe obſervations are indeed only an enlargement of what I have before advanced upon this topic in the Remarks: but in every controverſy which has the aſcertainment of truth for its object, it is neceſſary again and again to advert to thoſe leading points by which the deciſion of the judicious and diſcerning enquirer muſt ultimately be influenced; and more eſpecially when a diſpoſition is apparent to aggravate and diſtort by all the artifices of declamation and invective, and to perplex by all the ſubtilties of a flimſy and verboſe argumentation, thoſe ſubordi-

nate facts which are in reality of little or no importance, when a general concluſion is to be drawn in accordance to the calm judgment of reaſon.

There are very few particulars in the latter part of Mr. Marſh's pamphlet which, in my opinion, merit the leaſt notice. The perſonalities I willingly paſs over. There is a degree of meanneſs which it would be a degradation to a man of honour to attempt to clear himſelf from the ſuſpicion of; and which ſuſpicion ſuch a man would be the laſt to entertain of another. It is, however, incumbent on me to acknowledge an error, of no ſort of conſequence indeed, but which Mr. Marſh has, in his characteriſtic manner (p. 104), magnified into a moſt diſingenuous artifice: "ſuch as," he ſays, "will render me no ſervice in the end;" or, as he might have added, in the beginning either. In a note, p. 42, of the Remarks (4to edition), I have inadvertently mentioned the *plan* of incorporating Savoy with France; and the whole note is evidently written under the impreſſion that Savoy was not at the time M. Le Brun penned his diſpatch of January 7th, actually incorporated with the territory of the Republic. Had I adverted to the preciſe period of the annexation of that duchy,

duchy, I ſhould of courſe have corrected the expreſſion in ſome ſuch manner as the following: "It is probable, indeed, that France would not "even at this time have reſcinded the act by "which ſhe declared the incorporation of Sa-"voy," &c. And I ſolemnly proteſt, that there is not a man in the three kingdoms, of any party or deſcription whatever, whom I ſhould have ſuſpected of ſo vile, and at the ſame time ſo uſeleſs, an artifice as that which Mr. Marſh is pleaſed publicly to aſcribe to me.

In relation to the ſtrained and abſurd inferences deduced by Mr. Marſh from the circular letter of Monge, and that of the Executive Council to the Municipality of St. Malo, I have ſaid in the Remarks, and with that guarded decorum which I truſt it would not have diſcredited Mr. Marſh to imitate, "that when "a man, however reſpectable, ſuffers his preju-"dices to carry him to ſuch lengths of party "zeal—for *party malevolence* is a phraſe of "odious ſound—it is neceſſary to read with "extreme caution whatever he may write, and "to credit rather what he ſhall prove than "what he ſhall ſay." This, however, diſpleaſes Mr. Marſh extremely: and he ſays, at the concluſion of a long argument, "My gentle

" adverſary ſhould have recollected that in my " Hiſtory I have proved every thing, whereas " Mr. Belſham in his own Hiſtory has proved " nothing. I have made it a rule to ſupport " every fact by authorities which cannot be " called in queſtion, but Mr. Belſham has given " only his bare word." Now, excluſive of mere references, there are contained in the Hiſtory which I have publiſhed many hundred quotations from original papers: and at the concluſion of my Reply to Mr. Coxe, I have ſubjoined a catalogue of more than fifty authors from whom I have made citations in the courſe of the work. I have alſo written and publiſhed ſix elaborate diſſertations upon various ſubjects of importance comprehended in the Hiſtory, my repreſentations relative to which had either actually been, or were, as I thought, moſt likely to be controverted; containing a great number of appeals to original authorities: and yet Mr. Marſh ſays, at the riſk of his own credit, ſurely much more than of mine, that I have given the public only my bare word for any thing that I have related*.

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* As Mr. Marſh is ſo kindly concerned for my reputation, he will no doubt be happy to learn that I have been for a conſiderable time paſt engaged, at my hours of leiſure, in tranſcribing to of the different collections which have appeared at different

As to the Hiſtory of Mr. Marſh, for *him*, the perpetual panegyriſt of his own work, to tell us that it actually proves what it was undoubtedly meant to prove, viz. that the miniſtry of 1792-3 could not by any effort of human wiſdom have avoided the preſent deſtructive and ruinous war, is merely begging the queſtion. In my opinion, and in that of very many others, it proves no ſuch thing; but, on the contrary, our verdict is, that it furniſhes very ample materials to prove the contrary.

Mr. Marſh would fain have it ſuppoſed, vide chapter xiv. of his Hiſtory, that General Dumouriez has repreſented the French Executive Council as inſincere in the negotiation with England; which every one who has read the Memoirs of that extraordinary man muſt be convinced he has not: and I have replied to Mr. Marſh's logic, ſuch as it is, on this head. In the

different periods, a ſeries of the moſt important ſtate papers from the revolution to the preſent time, as the beſt and moſt deciſive confirmation of the facts advanced in my hiſtory; and that taking advantage of the numerous criticiſms which have been made upon it, I have carefully reviſed and corrected the whole; thinking this the beſt return I could make to the public for the great favour and indulgence with which it has been, and ſtill continues to be, received.

Vindication of his Hiſtory, he ſays, p. 110, " that " it is of no importance to his argument whether " Dumouriez has repreſented the French rulers " as innſicere in their negotiation or not." But he nevertheleſs perſiſts in his aſſertion, " that " Dumouriez really has repreſented them as in- " ſincere; for in the firſt volume of his Memoirs, " where he ſpeaks of his own reſidence in Paris " at the beginning of January, 1793, while Le " Brun was carrying on the negotiation with " England, and at the ſame time concerting mea- " ſures with Dumouriez for the next campaign, " he expreſsly ſays, ' that Le Brun deſired the " general to pay no regard to the negotiation.' " But this pretended proof is, if poſſible, more untenable than that which I had refuted in the Remarks; for this is the language which a ſtateſman would naturally, while a negotiation was pending, uſe to a general in reſpect to his warlike preparations, eſpecially if he knew that the negotiation muſt terminate very ſhortly, and had very little expectation of its terminating ſucceſsfully. Every one who takes the trouble to conſult the Memoirs, will perceive how perfectly futile is this argument of Mr. Marſh.

On the other hand, M. Dumouriez certainly does repreſent Mr. Pitt as inſincere in the conduct

duct of the negotiation; and Mr. Marſh is very indignant that I ſhould have twice quoted the paſſage in which he brings this charge againſt the Engliſh miniſter, without reprehending him *each time* for advancing what he ſays *I know* to be a falſehood. This is indeed a very curious accuſation. I had previouſly given it as my opinion, and it could be nothing more than an opinion, in which too I differ from many perſons to whoſe judgment I pay great deference, that Mr. Pitt was ſincere in his wiſhes for peace. But the reader has ſurely a right to know the opinion of M. Dumouriez as well as mine; from which opinion I was ſo far from drawing any inference to Mr. Pitt's diſadvantage, that on having occaſion to quote the paſſage a ſecond time, to avoid whatever might appear invidious, I had expreſsly ſaid M. Dumouriez was probably miſtaken; and yet I am charged with illiberal treatment of Mr. Pitt! Upon this head of accuſation, at leaſt, I am perſuaded that Mr. Pitt would acquit his opponent, and laugh at his advocate.

I apprehend, on the contrary, that I may, with much more colour of reaſon, be charged with an exceſs than a deficiency of candour, in affirming, without qualification or reſerve, p. 45, quarto, "That Mr. Pitt was actuated by a real

" deſire of peace:" and again, p. 63, " that " he certainly wiſhed for peace." But ſuppoſing Mr. Pitt ſincere in his wiſhes for peace, as the policy which the national intereſt required, a tame and paſſive acquieſcence in meaſures which could not but terminate in war, combined with his ſubſequent and public juſtification of thoſe meaſures, was in his ſituation the greateſt of all moral and political delinquencies.

I objected, in the Remarks (p. 48, quarto), to the abſurd repreſentation which Mr. Marſh had given of the furious ſpeech of Carra in the Convention (January 2, 1793); as if it contained the ſentiments of the whole body, and compared it to the famous invective of Mr. Burke in the Britiſh Houſe of Commons, February, 1790. Mr. Marſh ſays, in his Vindication, p. 113, that many other members of the Convention, Danton, Barrere, &c. held ſimilar language: and did not many other members of the Britiſh Parliament, Mr. Windham, Mr. Jenkinſon, &c. as far as their power of language extended, emuloufly vie in the ſame manner with Mr. Burke? In order for ever to ſilence all objections, Mr. Marſh, at the concluſion of his argument, obſerves, that on one occaſion the Aſſembly all ſwore hatred to kings and royalty. But at the

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period when this oath was taken, September 4, 1792, did any one ſuppoſe that it extended, or was meant to extend, farther than to the kingly and royal government of France; the ſubverſion of which had juſt taken place, and the reſtoration of which they abhorred and deprecated? Was this declaration ever made the ſubject of complaint by England, or indeed by any other power? If in this country, attached to our own form of limited monarchy, we think it meritorious on *all* occaſions to declare our hatred to republican principles, why may not the French be permitted by *one* ſolemn avowal to declare their hatred to royaliſm? in which the king of England had no more reaſon to think himſelf perſonally alluded to, than the king of Melinda; or than the commonwealths of Holland and Switzerland to believe they were in any inſtance reflected upon by our exclamations againſt republicaniſm in England.

At the period when the negotiation was pending, M. Briſſot was by far the moſt popular and powerful orator in the Convention, and was ſtrictly connected with the principal members of the Executive Council. I have quoted therefore largely from a very celebrated ſpeech of this admired orator, in order to aſſiſt us in forming a judgment

judgment of the nature of the policy which the governing party in France at this time adopted, and of the general views and ſentiments which they wiſhed to infuſe into the minds of the Convention and people at large. If nothing of this kind is to be gathered from ſuch a ſpeech as this, delivered by ſuch a man at a period ſo critical, it would be ſtrange indeed; although M. Briſſot at the commencement of his harangue was, as I obſerved, compelled to make an undoubted ſacrifice of truth to the violence of this anarchic aſſembly, by aſſirming in the name of the Committee whoſe report he preſented, that the complaints of the Britiſh Cabinet had no juſt foundation.

This circumſtance, however, affords an excellent pretext to ſuch a reaſoner, or more properly wrangler, as Mr. Marſh, to attempt altogether to ſet aſide the conſideration of this ſpeech, as wholly uſeleſs: and it is wonderful that we are not exhorted to re-peruſe ſome long and ſomniferous chapter of his own Hiſtory inſtead of it. But the inferences to be drawn from this ſpeech in the diſcuſſion of the preſent queſtion do not, as reaſoners of another claſs will eaſily diſcern, in the leaſt depend upon the truth of his aſſertions, but altogether upon the moderation

tion of his counſels; which, as well as thoſe of his colleague M. Kerſaint, are manifeſtly favourable to the preſervation of peace with England, if attainable by any reaſonable means: and compared with the cotemporary ſpeeches of Mr. Burke and Mr. Windham in the Britiſh Parliament, or even thoſe of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas, they are, as will be obſerved by many readers no doubt with ſurpriſe, perfectly cool and temperate.

The next of the almoſt endleſs occaſions of difference between Mr. Marſh and myſelf relates to the refuſal of Lord Grenville to receive, *under the preſent circumſtances*, the new credentials of M. Chauvelin, i. e. as I have expreſſed it, while a negotiation was depending between the two countries of the higheſt importance, and the ſucceſs of which might depend upon the recognition of the embaſſador. In anſwer to this, Mr. Marſh affirms, p. 116, that the negotiation was terminated from the 13th January, the day on which the note of Le Brun was delivered by Chauvelin, *as he has fully proved in his Hiſtory.* But this point he had better diſpute with Lord Grenville, who in his reply to Le Brun's note expreſsly ſays to M. Chauvelin, after declining diſcuſſion on ſeparate points, "if you have any

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" explanation to give me under the ſame extra-
" official form which will embrace all the ob-
" jects contained in my letter of the 31ſt De-
" cember, as well as all the points which relate
" to the preſent criſis in England, her allies, and
" the general ſyſtem of Europe, I ſhall willingly
" attend to them." I have therefore to boaſt his Lordſhip's ſanction for my aſſertion, that the negotiation was depending, though, to uſe his own happy phraſeology, *in an extra-official form*. Here Mr. Marſh has evidently overſhot his mark; but let me adviſe him not to differ too incautiouſly from the noble and illuſtrious perſonages whoſe conduct he is ſo eager to defend; for " if they turn him off as a politician," to borrow an alluſion from a celebrated comedy, " I know not who will take him in."

Mr. Marſh having aſſerted, " that the Britiſh
" miniſters muſt neceſſarily have preferred the
" continuance of a monarchical form of go-
" vernment in France to the eſtabliſhment of a
" republic, *becauſe* great republics are naturally
" inclined to be both reſtleſs in themſelves, and
" to diſturb the peace of their neighbours;" I took the liberty (Remarks, quarto, p. 58) to aſk him this plain queſtion, " If we take a retroſpec-
" tive view of the hiſtory of France for the laſt

" 250

" 250 years, what great republic could be more " reſtleſs in itſelf than this great Monarchy for " the firſt half of that term, or more diſpoſed to " diſturb the peace of her neighbours than ſhe " has moſt notoriouſly been for the latter part " of it?" To which, inſtead of giving a plain anſwer, he uncivilly and evaſively replies, p. 118, " that he cannot ſay what idea I affix to the " terms repoſe and diſturbance; but that, ac- " cording to their common acceptation, he " thinks it muſt be allowed, that the French Re- " public has ſo effectually diſturbed the repoſe " of their neighbours, as to have produced among " them more political revolutions within the " compaſs of ten years than the French Mo- " narchy did during the whole period of its ex- " iſtence." With a genuine controverſialiſt any ſubterfuge is preferable to any conceſſion. With Mr. Marſh's leave, the queſtion between us is, not what diſturbances this great Republic, attacked by all the great Monarchies in Europe, may have produced during ten years paſt; but what from the experience of paſt ages a great republic was likely to produce beyond what the Monarchy of France had actually done, in order to juſtify the preference of his Majeſty's Miniſters to the continuance of a monarchical government in that country? and this diſcuſſion Mr. Marſh

Marſh has prudently and ſilently waved. In fact, great monarchies and great republics have in all ages been, for the misfortune of mankind, ſo equally prone to diſturb the repoſe of the world, that a predilection for either, taken in this particular point of view, can reſt upon no adequate or ſolid foundation.

The ill humour of Mr. Marſh is no-where raiſed to an higher pitch than (p. 191) in conſequence of an accidental obſervation of mine, upon a prediction of his, importing that the inhabitants of France having diſcovered that they are fighting in ſupport of tyranny, and not of liberty, the ſame military enthuſiaſm cannot be expected from them in future. To which I replied, " that to this reflection the victories of " the preſent campaign, and the wide extent of " Gallic conqueſts from the Po to the Danube, " have already afforded a very deciſive anſwer." Mr. Marſh's indignation upon this occaſion is extreme; 1ſt, Becauſe the paſſage is marked with inverted commas, as a literal quotation; which is certainly incorrect and improper; but, chiefly, 2d, Becauſe I have omitted the words, " unleſs the fertility or invention, which is cha- " racteriſtic of the French Rulers, furniſhes new " means of inflaming it." Now I cannot conceive

ceive how this ſalvo can poſſibly help Mr. Marſh out of his embarraſſment; or why he ſhould be ſo anxious to obtain the inſertion of theſe words —which, if at all to his purpoſe, I certainly did him wrong to omit—unleſs he is able to explain in what manner the enthuſiaſm of the French army has been inflamed by the new means furniſhed, as he pretends, by M. Bonaparte's fertility of invention. It is notorious that the French armies, from the commencement of the war to the termination of it, have invariably diſcovered the ſame military enthuſiaſm; and their good or ill ſucceſs has been proportioned to the different degrees of military genius diſplayed by the generals who commanded them. This obſervation of Mr. Marſh is, in ſhort, one of thoſe idle predictions which have been ſo frequently hazarded in the courſe of the preſent war, and as frequently falſified by the event; and was indeed not worth noticing in any manner whatever.

I have ſaid, Remarks, quarto, p. 61, that notwithſtanding the rejection of M. Chauvelin's letters of credence from the Republic, that the French Government had the merit of making another effort for peace. This Mr. Marſh denies, and ſays, p. 123, "that this effort, if in-

"deed

" deed it can be called a merit, was solely the " work of Dumouriez;" and " that three of " the members of the Executive Council opposed " it with all their power." Now, whether the idea originated with the Council or with the General, it is certain that M. Dumouriez could not enter upon the negotiation without the acquiescence and authority of the Council. That Pache and Monge should oppose any farther pacific overture, who had assented so reluctantly to the former negotiation, was to be expected. The opposition of M. Clavieres, and the coldness of Le Brun and Garat, the latter of whom Mr. Marsh most ignorantly stigmatises as characteristically inimical to peace, arose, as is clearly apparent, from very different motives: and the account given by Mr. Marsh of this transaction, chapter xv. of his History, though of little moment, is founded in gross error. It is manifest that the members of the Executive Council received with jealousy and dislike the overture of peace from Dumouriez as an intrusion upon their province; and though they did not choose to put a direct negative upon it, they secretly resolved that he should not have the merit of effecting what they themselves had unsuccessfully attempted. To those who will take the trouble to examine the particulars of this complex business,

neſs, it will appear that the Executive Council had on the 26th January, three days only after the recal of M. Chauvelin, diſpatched M. Maret, the confidential agent approved by Mr. Pitt, to London, with freſh inſtructions and freſh conceſſions. Yet M. Dumouriez, who left Paris the very ſame day, was ſo ignorant of the real object of M. Maret's miſſion, that he repreſents that able and excellent negotiator as merely ſent to prepare the way for him; as was before obſerved in the Remarks, p. 61, quarto. Yet Mr. Marſh, ſlighting the important intelligence communicated by Mr. Miles, in his authentic correſpondence, relative to a matter of fact in which he could not be miſtaken, aſſerts, "that M. "Dumouriez's is the only evidence we have "upon the ſubject;" and affects, ridiculouſly enough, to reprehend me for entertaining an opinion *in defiance*, as he calls it, of the evidence of M. Dumouriez, as to a point reſpecting which he was manifeſtly and purpoſely kept by the Council in complete ignorance.

In relation to the miſſion of M. Maret, Mr. Marſh takes upon him to affirm, p. 24, that *I am ſenſible* it is of no conſequence to aſk at preſent what M. Maret's inſtructions were, when M. Maret did not offer to produce them. On

the contrary, if it is of any importance to determine whether the hoſtile mind in this buſineſs is chiefly to be aſcribed to the Government of France or that of England, and whether France was ſincere or inſincere in thoſe conceſſions which ſeemed to offer the faireſt baſis of negotiation, *I am ſenſible* it is of the utmoſt importance to aſcertain the general ſcope of M. Maret's inſtructions; which were generally believed upon very ſtrong grounds of probability to be highly pacific. And Mr. Miles expreſsly ſays, and it is by far the moſt intereſting information which his pamphlet contains, *although paſſed over in total ſilence by Mr. Marſh*, "The "propoſitions which the Executive Council had "authoriſed M. Maret to offer, and which would "have been offered if M. Chauvelin had not left "London, but which I am not at liberty to "reveal, were ſo different from the imperious "language which M. Le Brun had lately aſſum-"ed, and the conceſſions were ſo much greater "than it was reaſonable to ſuppoſe would have "been made after what had paſſed, that I "doubted the ſincerity of them at the time." The ſtubborn fact, that new and voluntary conceſſions were made by the Executive Council through the medium of M. Maret, is therefore indubitably aſcertained; and if thoſe conceſſions

were

were ſo great as Mr. Miles, who is at liberty to draw his own concluſions, frankly repreſents them to have been, they muſt have proved their own ſincerity: for the only great political queſtion really at iſſue was, what ſecurity the French would give for the reſtitution or relinquiſhment of the Netherlands at the æra of a general peace; which, if England had been the mediator, would in all probability have been eaſily and ſpeedily re-eſtabliſhed.

I do not *complain*, as Mr. Marſh aſſerts, p. 124, that no notice was taken by Lord Grenville of M. Maret's private note; but merely ſtate the fact: for *as I was ſenſible* that Lord Grenville poſſibly might not have any reaſon to imagine at the time that M. Maret came over upon any other buſineſs than that mentioned in his Note, there could in that caſe be no room for blame or animadverſion.

Mr. Marſh affects, p. 125, to find great fault with what he ſtyles my unwarranted manner of quoting paſſages; although the inſtances he adduces are extremely frivolous, not in the leaſt bearing upon the main queſtion: and he alſo alleges that I have on ſeveral occaſions miſrepreſented his ſenſe; which, in whatever inſtances

it may have happened, muſt have proceeded, I am ſure, from miſapprehenſion, and not from deſign: and I will never imitate the example of Lord Grenville in refuſing to admit whatever interpretation any perſons may think proper to offer of their own words. A few incorrectneſſes I acknowledge that Mr. Marſh has pointed out, which in a future edition of the Remarks ſhall be carefully rectified; and although the diſtance at which I reſide from the preſs makes it difficult to be perfectly accurate with reſpect to commas, points, and breaks, had I been aware of the very great ſtreſs which Mr. Marſh lays upon theſe minutiæ, I might no doubt have paid a more rigid attention to them. I do not know whether it can be allowed as any adequate apology to ſay, what is however the truth, that the Remarks were written rapidly, and with frequent interruptions in the midſt of buſineſs and company; and that I had no opportunity of reviſing the ſheets as they came from the printer. Conſidering the very ſtrict ſcrutiny they have now undergone, I am happy, however, that ſo few errors have been diſcovered by Mr. Marſh, and thoſe ſo venial. In one inſtance only does a particular anſwer to the charge of unfairneſs and want of *fidelity* in the quotation of documents advanced by Mr. Marſh, p. 126, ſeem in the leaſt degree ne-

neceſſary. I have cited, Remarks, p. 63, quarto, a paſſage from a letter written by General Dumouriez to General Miranda (January 23, 1793), merely for the purpoſe of proving that he had it in contemplation to go over to England in perſon to negotiate a peace. The few words I have quoted therefore are as follows: "On envoie un "agent ſecret fort connu de M. Pitt pour de- "mander un ſauf conduit pour moi, et l'aſſurance "d'être bien venu," &c.—omitting after—Mr. Pitt—the irrelevant words to me totally unintelligible, "et de M. Fox pour demander aux "deux partis, c'eſt-à-dire à la nation toute en- "tière, un ſauf-conduit," &c. Certainly, in the ſtrictneſs of the thing, a break ſhould, as Mr. Marſh obſerves, have been inſerted to ſhew that there was an omiſſion. But what good or evil purpoſe could be anſwered by uſing all the artifice which Mr. Marſh ſuppoſes to conceal this omiſſion, I may ſafely defy him or any other perſon to point out. Had I indeed omitted what would in any degree have affected the purpoſe for which the quotation was made, even if I had taken the precaution of inſerting a break, it would have been an unfaithful quotation; but Mr. Marſh's clamours of *infidelity* are excited by what any reader of common candour, or even of common ſenſe, muſt conſider as amounting at

moſt to a ſlight inaccuracy. As to the malignant inſinuations by which Mr. Marſh hopes, in conſequence of his abſurd gloſs upon this expreſſion of M. Dumouriez, to derogate from the luſtre of a character equally above his cenſure and his praiſe, they are infinitely too contemptible to become the ſubject of animadverſion. Mr. Marſh has got a fly at the end of his political teleſcope, and directing his inſtrument to the glorious luminary of heaven fancies it a monſter in the ſun.

Before I lay down my pen, I muſt beſtow a few words upon the document ſo pompouſly brought forward by Mr. Marſh in the Appendix to his Vindication, as deciſive evidence againſt France in the preſent queſtion. This document, which is ſpoken of by Mr. Marſh as "of the greateſt importance," is nothing more than the official account of a fact of public notoriety, viz. that the American Government had pronounced the war of France againſt England to be an offenſive one on the part of the former. Henceforth, therefore, Mr. Marſh exultingly boaſts, "that the warmeſt advocates of France "muſt abandon all hopes of ever obtaining "from an *impartial* jury a verdict in her fa-"vour." All this ſounds in my ears perfectly ludicrous.

ludicrous. The grand and laudable object of the Government of America, and of every wife man of every political party included in that government, was to maintain an abfolute neutrality between the two contending powers, and not to be drawn into a war with which fhe had no natural or political concern. But by the eleventh article of the treaty of alliance with France, figned at Paris, February 1778, America agreed to guarantee for ever to that power the actual poffeffions of France in the Weft Indies. It was therefore a matter of the utmoft moment to America in prefent circumftances to find out fome plaufible pretext to evade the inconvenience which might eventually refult from this guarantee. The prefident Waffhington, in confequence, put feveral queftions relative to the fituation of affairs to his Council of State, for the guidance of his conduct in this emergency. To the firft two queftions, Whether an embaffador from the REPUBLIC OF FRANCE fhould be received? and, Whether it were fitting that the treaties heretofore made with France fhould be confidered binding in prefent circumftances? the Council anfwered in the affirmative. To the third queftion, Is the guarantee in the treaty of alliance applicable to a defenfive war only?

only? they alſo anſwered affirmatively. And to the laſt queſtion, Whether the war was defenſive or offenſive? they replied, " entirely and unequivocally offenſive."

This Mr. Marſh repreſents as a moſt impartial verdict, although they had the greateſt poſſible intereſt in pronouncing a verdict againſt France. And though the juſtice of Mr. Marſh's obſervation will eaſily be admitted, " that it was the " verdict of a government which could not be " ſuſpected of a bias in favour of Great Bri- " tain," as they were not deciding upon an abſtract propoſition, they may by ſome perſons of leſs candour than Mr. Marſh poſſibly be ſuſpected of a bias in favour of themſelves. France, however, perfectly ſenſible of the embarraſſing ſituation of America, and reſting ſatisfied with the conceſſions in her favour contained in the two firſt anſwers, ſhewed no reſentment at this verdict in favour of England, extorted by the neceſſity of the caſe, and in a literal ſenſe juſtified by the French declaration of war againſt Great Britain, though not in the leaſt affecting the real merits of the queſtion, as the perſons whoſe names are ſubſcribed to the anſwers were much too enlightened not to know; and which Mr. Jefferſon,

Jefferson. [illegible]
preſident [illegible]
acknowledg[illegible]

In conſequen[illegible]
Marſh himſelf rem[illegible]
mediately iſſued, dec[illegible]
would remain neutral
at war. Such was the
deciſion which Mr. Marſh
ſagacity, regards as not liab
ſuſpicion of partiality, and as in
ſtated by the voice of Juſtice herſelf. O
contrary, I beg leave, in the name of myſelf and
thoſe *gentlemen of my party*, who for the reaſons
ſo often ſtated "are unwilling to acquit the
"British Cabinet," to challenge the whole
panel—as perſons, no doubt, otherwiſe highly
reſpectable, but deeply and obviouſly intereſted
in pronouncing a verdict againſt France, however
contrary to evidence.

I ſhall now, at the concluſion of theſe addi-
tional obſervations, upon which I have beſtowed
more attention than was perhaps on ſo exhauſted
a topic neceſſary, and which might eaſily be
extended to far greater length, ſay a few words
in vindication of my mode of reply to Mr.
Marſh.

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